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Admiralty Arrest Procedures Fail The Due
Process Test: Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
v. Vessel BAY RIDGE
Until recently the long-established procedures of the admi-
ralty in rem arrest' had never faced a serious constitutional
challenge. Federal courts began to question their constitutional-
ity,' however, soon after the Supreme Court's expanded enuncia-
tion of due process standards in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,3 Fuentes v. Shevin,' and Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.5 In
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Vessel BAY RIDGE,6 a federal
district court in Alaska became the first admiralty court to hold
1. These procedures are currently embodied in Rules C and E of the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The current rules were promulgated in 1966, but in rem arrest procedures are little
changed from those in the Admiralty Rules of 1920 and 1844. See Order Amending Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966); Order Adopting and Promulgating
United States Admiralty Rules, 254 U.S. 673 (1920); Order Adopting and Promulgating
Rules of Practice for the Courts of Admiralty, 44 U.S. (3 How.) ix (1845); 7A J. MooRE &
A. PELRZ, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 .01-.02, .20-.21 (2d ed. 1981). These proce-
dures, moreover, were in use long before embodiment in the rules. See, e.g., The NES-
TOR, 18 F. Cas. 9 (C.C.D. Me. 1831) (Story, J.); The INVINCIBLE, 13 F. Cas. 72, 76
(C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (Story, J.), aff'd, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816).
2. The majority of courts have upheld the constitutionality of the in rem arrest pro-
cedures. See Amstar Corp. v. S/S ALEXANDROS T., 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. KAIYO MARU No. 53, 503 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Alaska 1980); Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Dredge GENERAL G.L. GILLESPIE, 488 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D. La. 1980),
afl'd, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981); Sideris Shipping Co. v. MN CARIBBEAN ARROW,
1980 A.M.C. 1296 (M.D. Fla. 1979); A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. The Tug Boat CON-
DOR, 1979 A.M.C. 1696 (S.D. Cal. 1979); Stoner v. O/S NEISKA II, 1978 A.M.C. 2650
(D. Alaska 1978); Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Miss.
1976); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. S/T VALIANT KING, 1977 A.M.C. 1719 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
A few courts have ruled admiralty arrest procedures unconstitutional. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Vessel BAY RIDGE, 509 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Alaska 1981) (noted
case); P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Vessel SUSAN, 1980 A.M.C. 2062 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (dictum); Karl
Senner, Inc. v. M/V ACADIAN VALOR, 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980) (court had in
personam jurisdiction over owner), noted in 55 TUL. L. REV. 936 (1981); Techem Chem.
Co. v. M/T CHOYO MARU, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976) (dictum). For an analytical
overview of most of these decisions, see Batiza & Partridge, The Constitutional Chal-
lenge to Maritime Seizures, 26 Loy. L. REV. 203 (1980).
3. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
4. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
5. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
6. 509 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Alaska 1981).
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the arrest procedures unconstitutional in an action purely in
rem. 7 By applying the Supreme Court's due process standards to
admiralty cases, the court protected the maritime property
owner's rights. However, the holding does not protect the sub-
stantive rights of admiralty plaintiffs. In order to protect both
parties' rights, the Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure
should be amended to provide judicial participation in the
arrest, and immediate post-seizure hearing.
In Alyeska, an oil spill occurred during the loading of the
tanker BAY RIDGE at the terminal of the Alyeska pipeline.
Blaming the vessel and her crew for the mishap, the plaintiff
pipeline company brought an in rem action to enforce a mari-
time liens against the BAY RIDGE and secured the vessel's
arrest pursuant to Supplemental Rule C of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.9 The owners and charterers of the BAY RIDGE
7. The only other decision to actually strike down an in rem arrest was Karl Senner,
Inc. v. M/V ACADIAN VALOR, 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980). In Senner, the court
also had in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the seized vessel.
'8. For a discussion of the maritime lien, see infra text accompanying notes 16-28. In
Alyeska, the claimants argued that the costs to a private party of removing oil from
navigable waters does not establish a maritime lien. Relying on California Dep't of Fish
and Game v. S.S. BOURNEMOUTH, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969), the Alyeska
court held that a maritime lien was established. 509 F. Supp. at 1118.
9. Rule C provides, in pertinent part:
ACTIONS IN REM: SPECIAL PROVISIONS
(1) When available. An action in rem may be brought:
(a) To enforce any maritime lien;
(b) Whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime
action in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto.
Except as otherwise provided by law a party who may proceed in rem may
also, or in the alternative, proceed in personam against any person who may be
liable....
(2) Complaint. In actions in rem the complaint shall be verified on oath or
solemn affirmation. It shall describe with reasonable particularity the property
that is the subject of the action and state that it is within the district or will be
during the pendency of the action....
(3) Process. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue
a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of
the action and deliver it to the marshal for service....
(4) Notice. No notice other than the execution of the process is required
when the property that is the subject of the action has been released in accord-
ance with Rule E(5). If the property is not released within 10 days after execu-
tion of process, the plaintiff shall promptly or within such time as may be
allowed by the court cause public notice of the action and arrest to be given in
a newspaper of general circulation in the district, designated by order of the
court. Such notice shall specify the time within which the answer is required to
be filed as provided by subdivision (6) of this rule. ...
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intervened as claimants and brought a motion to dismiss the
complaint and vacate the arrest. The court granted the motion,
holding that where arrest is initiated by a private party the pro-
cedures of Rules C and E violate basic concepts of due process
as defined in the Sniadach and Fuentes series of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.
Seizure of a vessel under Rule C is a summary ex parte pro-
cedure. The court clerk issues a warrant for the arrest of the
vessel upon the filing of a verified complaint.10 The allegations
must be sufficiently specific to allow the defendant or claimant
to commence an investigation without moving for a more defi-
nite statement.11 If the property is not released within ten days
of the seizure, notice by publication is required; otherwise, the
only notice required is execution of process upon the property
by the United States Marshal.' The plaintiff need not post a
preseizure bond for the protection of the owner, but is required
to pay any costs involved in seizing and maintaining the arrested
property.' Nothing in the rules assures the property owner a
prompt postseizure hearing to test the validity of the plaintiff's
claim.
The Rule C arrest is an in rem procedure, allowing the
plaintiff to proceed directly against the seized property as the
defendant.1 4 The sole purpose of the in rem action is to carry
the maritime lien into effect.1'
A maritime lien arises from certain admiralty claims in con-
tract, or tort," and gives the aggrieved party a property interest
(6) Claim and Answer. .... The claimant of property that is the subject of
an action in rem shall file his claim within 10 days after process has been exe-
cuted, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the court, and shall
serve his answer within 20 days after the filing of the claim. The claim shall be
verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state the interest in the prop-
erty by virtue of which the claimant demands its restitution and the right to
defend the action ...
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C(2), (3). See supra note 9 (text of rule).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(2)(a).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C(4). See supra note 9 (text of rule).
13. FKD. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(4)(e) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1976)).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(4)(e). Under American admiralty law the vessel is
viewed as a legal person, independently liable as the defendant in a proceeding in rem to
enforce a maritime lien. G. GILMORz & C. BLACK, TH LAw op ADMRALTY, § 9-3 (2d ed.
1975). Under Rule C the plaintiff may also proceed in personam against any person who
may be liable. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C(1)(b). See supra note 9 (text of rule).
15. The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867).
16. G. GELMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 9-20.
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in the res equal to the amount of the alleged liability. 17 The lien
may arise even though the owner of the vessel is not personally
liable on the underlying claim.1 8 Enforcement of the lien
through a judicial sale of the property gives the new purchaser a
good title free from all other interests, including all maritime
liens.19 On the other hand, a maritime lien survives a private
sale, even a sale to an innocent purchaser.2 0 Generally, among
maritime lienholders the latest lien has first priority to the pro-
ceeds of a judicial sale. 1
The maritime lien plays an important role in facilitating the
smooth operation of maritime commerce.2' Suppliers and others
who do business with vessels are more likely to extend credit to
even a strange or foreign ship because the remedy of a maritime
lien is available. Without the lien the vessel would no longer
serve as security for any contractual or tort liability she might
incur and some other form of security would be required prior to
dealing with the vessel. Arranging for letters of credit or similar
security could prove costly and in some instances delay the ves-
sel.23 Moreover, the importance of the maritime lien and in rem
arrest is magnified by their universal acceptance in international
maritime law. Because the lien is recognized throughout the
world,'4 it is a critical part of admiralty jurisprudence, and in
United States' territories the only way it may be enforced is by
the procedures of the Rule C in rem arrest.25
The claimants in Alyeska argued that these procedures do
not afford maritime property owners due process' 6 as required
by the series of Supreme Court cases beginning in 1969 with
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'7 In Sniadach, the Supreme
Court struck down a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute that
17. Id. § 1-12.
18. Id. § 9-5 to -16. For example, if an innocent purchaser bought the vessel by
private sale after a maritime lien had arisen against the vessel, the vessel could be seized
and sold to satisfy the lien holder's claim even though the new owner could not have
been personally liable on the claim.
19. Id. § 9-2.
20. The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867).
21. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 9-2.
22. 2 A. SANN, S. BELLMAN & B. CHASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 21 (rev. 7th ed.
1981).
23. Id.
24. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 9-85.
25. Id. § 1-12.
26. 509 F. Supp. at 1118.
27. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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failed to provide the wage-earner with notice or an opportunity
to be heard before the garnishment.
Forcing maritime lienholders to provide preseizure notice,
however, would severely limit the effectiveness of the in rem
action. Because of the extremely mobile nature of vessels and
the necessity of a seizure to acquire in rem jurisdiction, prior
notice would allow the owner to avoid or postpone suit by
removing his vessel or other assets from the jurisdiction of the
district court where the plaintiff brought the action. Delay in
suit could effectively extinguish the plaintiff's remedy by
increasing the chances that a later maritime lien will arise. If the
value of a subsequent lien exceeded the value of the property,
the earlier lienholder's interest in the property would disap-
pear.28 The argument against requiring preseizure notice would
apply a fortiori to a preseizure hearing. No admiralty court has
held that preseizure notice and hearing are strictly required by
the Constitution.2 '
In Fuentes v. Shevin,80 the Court extended the require-
ments of Sniadach to deprivations of any type of property, but
also recognized an exception to the requirements of prior notice
and hearing in certain "extraordinary situations." The Court
listed three conditions which must be met for the exception to
apply: first, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest; second, there
must be a special need for very prompt action; and finally, a
government official responsible for determining whether seizure
is necessary or justified must be the one who initiates the
seizure.3 1
Several admiralty courts have seized upon the "extraordi-
nary situation" exception as justification for the procedures of
admiralty arrest. Some have found the public interest require-
ment inherently satisfied by the jurisdictional nature of the in
rem arrest. In Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp.,2 a federal
district court in Mississippi found that the acquisition of juris-
28. See supra text accompanying note 21.
29. In Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V ACADIAN VALOR, 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La.
1980), the court found the in rem arrest unconstitutional when "accomplished without
prior notice, hearing or judicial intervention." Id. at 295. See supra note 7.
30. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the Supreme Court struck down Florida and
Pennsylvania replevin statutes that authorized summary seizure without prior notice to
the owner or an opportunity for him to be heard. Id.
31. Id. at 90-91.
32. 417 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
19821
University of Puget Sound Law Review
diction over a vessel is an important public interest and there-
fore a Rule C arrest meets the first Fuentes requirement. A dis-
trict court in California reached the same conclusion in A/S
Hjalmer Bjorges Rederi v. The Tug Boat CONDOR.'3 The
courts in Central Soya and CONDOR relied heavily on the
Fuentes Court's citation" of Ownbey v. Morgan" for the pro-
position that acquisition of jurisdiction is in itself an important
public interest. Reliance on Ownbey, however, is misplaced. In
Ownbey, the Court upheld an attachment statute that required
a nonresident defendant whose property had been attached to
post a special bail before he could appear and defend. The
defendant challenged only the requirement that he post bail
before he could defend. Thus, the issue was the validity of the
bail requirement rather than the validity of the attachment to
secure jurisdiction." The Supreme Court, in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 7 further weakened reliance on Ownbey by pointing out in a
footnote the actual issue in Ownbey and stating: "We do not
read the recent references to Ownbey as necessarily suggesting
that Ownbey is consistent with more recent decisions interpret-
ing the Due Process Clause.""
The public interest requirement is better explained in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.," the only
Supreme Court case to apply the "extraordinary situation"
exception. In Calero-Toledo, the Court upheld a Puerto Rican
statute that authorized the seizure and forfeiture by police of a
pleasure boat used for drug smuggling. The public interest
served in Calero-Toledo was more than just the acquisition of
jurisdiction. The seizure also prevented continued criminal use
of the property. The Alyeska court construed Calero-Toledo to
require something beyond acquisition of jurisdiction to satisfy
the public interest test of Fuentes; the acquisition of jurisdiction
33. 1979 A.M.C. 1696, 1702 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
34. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
35. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
36. Id. at 100, 103.
37. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
38. Id. at 194 n.10. It should be noted that the majority opinion in Shaffer was
limited to the issue of jurisdictional due process.
39. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Calero-Toledo did not involve an admiralty seizure.
Although it involved the seizure of a vessel, the arrest was carried out pursuant to a
Puerto Rican forfeiture statute rather than the Supplemental Rules of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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must itself serve some important public interest.40 The CON-
DOR court argued that the public interest requirement was met
by the public's vested interest in the smooth operation of mari-
time commerce.41 The Alyeska court, however, found that only
private interests were directly at stake in an action initiated by a
private party.4' The list of examples of "extraordinary situa-
tions" in Fuentes, indicating circumstances involving govern-
mental or general public concern, supports the view of the Aly-
eska court.
The Alyeska holding also makes sense in light of the third"extraordinary situation" requirement: the initiation of the
seizure by a governmental official. A seizure initiated by a public
official normally involves an obvious governmental or public
interest; more than private purposes are served. Although most
courts have acknowledged that the second Fuentes requirement
of a need for very prompt action is met in admiralty arrests, no
court has found that the arrest meets the third requirement
where the plaintiff is a private party."
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 45 the Supreme Court
retreated from its strict Sniadach and Fuentes requirements of
preseizure notice and hearing. The Mitchell Court upheld Loui-
siana sequestration procedures that allowed seizure without
prior notice and hearing. The Court found, however, that the
Louisiana statute had four saving features." First, the statute
required judicial supervision of the writ-issuing procedure. Sec-
40. 509 F. Supp. at 1122.
41. 1979 A.M.C. at 1702.
42. 509 F. Supp. at 1119. The court in Alyeska had itself applied the "extraordinary
situation" exception in the earlier case of United States v. KAIYO MARU No. 53, 503 F.
Supp. 1075 (D. Alaska 1980). That case involved the United States Coast Guard's seizure
of a fishing vessel for violations of a federal statute. The Fuentes requirements were
clearly met in KAiYo MuRu. The arrest was initiated by government officials to enforce
federal fishing laws. Id. at 1088. A prompt seizure was necessary to enforce the law
before the vessel left the United States' territorial jurisdiction. Id.
43. As the Fuentes Court stated: "Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of
property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to
protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." 407 U.S. at 91-92.
The Fuentes Court went on to state that no important governmental or general public
interest is served when "no more than private gain is directly at stake." Id.
44. The courts in Central Soya and CONDOR each argued that this deficiency alone
does not invalidate the arrest. Central Soya, 417 F. Supp. at 662-64; CONDOR, 1979
A.M.C. at 1702.
45. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
46. Id. at 605-06.
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ond, the complaint must have been verified and based on spe-
cific, nonconclusory allegations. Third, an immediate post-
seizure hearing was provided; and finally, the statute required
the plaintiff to file a preseizure bond sufficient to protect against
mistaken seizure. It is not clear whether the Court found all of
these features necessary to protect the property owner.",
The Alyeska court found that the arrest procedures of the
Federal Rules do not contain the additional safeguards articu-
lated in Mitchell. The court noted that the rules fail to require
judicial participation in the warrant-issuing process, noncon-
clusory allegations in the complaint, the posting of a pre-arrest
bond by the plaintiff, and an immediate postseizure hearing for
the property owner. 48 The Alyeska court also found that the
Local Rules of the Federal District Court of Alaska did not pro-
vide the missing safeguards."
Another federal district court in Merchants National Bank
v. Dredge General G.L. GILLESPIE50 held that a local rule pro-
viding for a prompt postseizure hearing guarantees procedural
due process to a maritime property owner. The argument that a
prompt postseizure hearing is the only Mitchell safeguard
required to assure the owner due process is not without merit.
The other Mitchell safeguards-judicial supervision, noncon-
clusory allegations, and a preseizure bond-are all ex parte pro-
cedures. They leave the protection of the property owner's rights
in the hands of someone other than the property owner. While it
is possible that a judge's review of nonconclusory allegations
might weed out some frivolous or ungrounded claims and that a
preseizure bond might discourage malicious or mistaken suits,
no ex parte procedure can ever be a sure guarantee against such
dangers. 1 On the other hand, an immediate postseizure hearing
47. Whether the Supreme Court would have upheld the Louisiana statute with
fewer safeguards cannot be determined. In North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a garnishment statute that
had none of the saving characteristics of Mitchell. Certainly some of the Mitchell safe-
guards standing alone would be insufficient. Both of the replevin statutes in Fuentes
required the plaintiff to post a security bond before seizure, yet the Court found this
safeguard insufficient. 407 U.S. at 81-82.
48. 509 F. Supp. at 1120.
49. Id.
50. 488 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. As the Fuentes Court stated:
Lawyers and judges are familiar with the phenomenon of a party mistakenly
but firmly convinced that his view of the facts and law will prevail, and there-
fore quite willing to risk the costs of litigation. Because of the understandable,
[Vol. 5:367
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is an adversary proceeding in which the property owner has the
opportunity to explain any factual or legal deficiencies in the
allegations. As the Fuentes Court points out:
[W]hen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own
defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say,
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of prop-
erty interests can be prevented. It has long been recognized
that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided
determination of facts decisive of rights .... [And] no better
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and an opportunity to meet it."' 2
An immediate postseizure hearing where the plaintiff must
prove probable cause would prevent the most serious damages
likely to arise from an unwarranted or mistaken seizure of prop-
erty. A hearing would cure most of the ills the other safeguards
prevent as well as avoid the dangers that those ex parte proce-
dures cannot prevent. A guarantee of an immediate postseizure
hearing is certainly the most crucial and basic of Mitchell's safe-
guards and should be the absolute minimum guaranteed to the
property owner.
The Alyeska court observed that in most cases involving
private parties, due process requires nonconclusory allegations
and judicial participation as well as immediate postseizure hear-
ing.53 Review of the writ and complaint by a judge or magistrate
would be especially meaningful in an in rem action where the
right to the arrest is contingent upon the existence of a maritime
lien. A quick review by a judicial officer would prevent arrests
legally unsupported by a maritime lien in the plaintiff. Judicial
scrutiny of the complaint also would effectively cure the ills of
conclusory allegations. A preseizure bond, however, should not
be required. The only way it prevents an unwarranted seizure is
to discourage malicious or careless claims. The same purpose is
accomplished in admiralty arrest by the current requirement
self-interested fallibility of litigants, a court does not decide a dispute until it
has had an opportunity to hear both sides-and does not generally take even
tentative action until it has itself examined the support for the plaintiff's
position.
407 U.S. at 83-84.
52. Id. at 81 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
53. 509 F. Supp. at 1123.
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that plaintiff post a bond for the costs of maintaining the vessel
while in the custody of the court." Consequently, the Supple-
mental Rules should be amended to provide for a prompt post-
seizure hearing and preseizure judicial review of the complaint.
Rule C's current notice provision 8 satisfies due process
requirements. In the seminal case of Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 56 the Supreme Court stated that notice
should be of a nature to reasonably convey the required infor-
mation and that the means should be the type that would be
used by one who wanted to actually inform the interested party.
If the chosen method is reasonably certain to inform those
affected it is constitutionally valid.5 7 Notice by execution of pro-
cess upon the vessel is probably the only method that is reasona-
bly certain to quickly inform the owners and charterers of the
plaintiff's action against the ship.58 As agent for the owner or
charterers, the master of the vessel is immediately made aware
of the arrest. The master can then inform the appropriate inter-
ested parties.
Although most admiralty courts that have ruled on the con-
stitutionality of in rem arrest procedures have recognized the
applicability of the Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell decisions,
some have found that nonadmiralty decisions cannot determine
the constitutionality of admiralty procedures. In Amstar Corp.
v. SIS ALEXANDROS T., 5 the Fourth Circuit pointed to the
fact that the Supreme Court never referred to maritime law and
practice in any of the opinions cited. The Amstar court found
this omission significant noting that, although the Supreme
Court relied on precedents from many areas of common law, it
made no reference to two centuries of admiralty suits in rem.10
Certainly maritime law in general is recognized as distinct from
the common law' and is not bound by common law. In Snia-
54. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(4)(e) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1976)).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C(4). See supra note 9 (text of rule).
56. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. Id. at 314-15.
58. Amstar Corp. v. S/S ALEXANDROS T., 664 F.2d 904, 911 (4th Cir. 1981).
59. 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 909.
61. Id. at 908. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 1-16. Admi-
ralty law has its roots in the civil law. In the Process Act of 1789, Congress directed the
federal courts to employ the "forms and modes of proceedings" of the civil law rather
than the common law in admiralty and maritime cases. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2,
1 Stat. 93-94. The justification for maintaining this autonomy derives from the maritime
context in which admiralty is set. In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890).
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dach, Fuentes, and Mitchell, the Supreme Court dealt primarily
with the constitutional rights of property owners in the event of
property seizures. Admiralty law is not exempt from constitu-
tional limitations."' Whether or not the Supreme Court
expressly intended that its decisions bind admiralty courts, the
due process standards it laid down would seem at least to be
strong persuasive authority in determining the due process
rights of a maritime property owner and should be adopted
unless lower standards are justified by substantive admiralty
law. For example, the Amstar court and a district court in Beth-
lehem Steel Corp. v. SIT VALIANT KING,3 argued that the
Supreme Court's decisions are inapplicable even as persuasive
authority because of the differences between admiralty arrests
and the attachment statutes involved in Sniadach, Fuentes, and
Mitchell.
Admiralty arrest is substantively unique from other seizure
remedies because of its in rem nature. The attachments in the
Sniadach line of cases were in personam actions to enforce the
liability of the property owner. The admiralty arrest, on the
other hand, is a suit in rem to enforce a property interest in the
thing seized." The plaintiff proceeds directly against the seized
property itself, which is personified as the defendant." This per-
sonification of the vessel has been much criticized as "a fiction
whose real value is simply as a mechanism to enforce the in per-
sonam liability of the owner."" But fiction or not, the personifi-
cation principle remains a vital part of admiralty jurisprudence
and an in rem action may be successful even though the owner is
62. United States v. Steel Tank Barge H 1651, 272 F. Supp. 658, 659-60 (E.D. La.
1967) (affirming due process notice requirement in admiralty actions).
63. 1977 A.M.C. 1719 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
64. The nature of the remedy in rem is very different from an in personam action as
explained by one authority:
The foundation for the effective exercise of jurisdiction in rem is the taking of
the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action into the custody of
the court and the characteristic virtue of a proceeding in rem is that it oper-
ates directly upon the res as the titular respondent in the suit and the actual
subject-matter of the jurisdiction and not, as at common law, mediately
through the right, title or interest of a party brought before the court as defen-
dant through personal service or the mere attachment of property as his with a
view to subjecting his interest therein to the satisfaction of the judgment.
2 A. SANN, S. BELLMAN & B. CHASE, BENEDIcr ON ADfIRu.TY § 22, at 2-9 to -11 (rev. 7th
ed. 1981) (footnote omitted).
65. See supra note 14.
66. Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V ACADIAN VALOR, 485 F. Supp. 287, 292 & n.8 (E.D.
La. 1980). See also G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 9-18(a).
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not liable." Looking to the vessel's personification as defendant,
the court in VALIANT KING argued that the Constitution does
not guarantee due process rights to an inanimate object." This
argument ignores the full import of the personification theory.
The vessel is transformed into a legal person for jurisdictional
purposes. Therefore, a court's power over the vessel must be
exercised as it would be over any other legal person. 9 Further-
more, the personification of the vessel does not obscure the fact
that vessels are owned by people who are to be protected by the
Constitution from unwarranted or mistaken deprivation of their
property. 0
The in rem action is also different from attachment because
it may determine more than just the property interest of a
defendant. The judgment decides the rights of all who may have
an interest in the property.1 Upon a judicial sale following a
judgment in rem, the new purchaser is given a title free from all
prior claims,71 whereas in an in personam action, the plaintiff
takes only the interest of the defendant owner. However, the
drastic nature of admiralty arrest does not justify withholding
from maritime property owners minimal due process protection
against unwarranted or mistaken deprivation of their property.
The substantive differences between admiralty arrest and
nonadmiralty attachment do not outweigh the more important
procedural similarities. In both situations a property owner is
deprived of his property by summary and ex parte seizure.
Whether the action is in personam or in rem, the owner is sub-
ject to the danger of an unwarranted or mistaken deprivation of
property. Both the admiralty arrest and the state attachment
statutes are primarily designed to provide security for a plain-
tiff's underlying claim. Indeed, the interest of an admiralty
plaintiff is especially similar to the interests protected by the
sequestration statute upheld in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.' s In
both cases, if immediate action is not taken to seize the defen-
dant's property, the property may be removed from the court's
jurisdiction, thereby defeating the plaintiff's claim. These proce-
67. G. GiLMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 14, § 9-5 to -16.
68. 1977 A.M.C. at 1721-24.
69. Senner, 485 F. Supp. at 294.
70. Batiza & Partridge, supra note 2, at 239.
71. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303, 306 (1915).
72. The TRENTON, 4 F. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880).
73. 416 U.S. at 604-11; Senner, 485 F. Supp. at 293-94.
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dural similarities support the Alyeska court's holding that the
Sniadach and Fuentes standards should apply to admiralty in
rem arrests.
The existence of the plaintiff's maritime lien in an admi-
ralty action in rem does not require a lowered due process stan-
dard for maritime property owners. The guarantee of judicial
review and a prompt postseizure hearing would not interfere
with the effective enforcement of a maritime lien through in rem
arrest. Nor would the substantive rights of the plaintiff be
changed by amendment of the arrest procedures.
The Alyeska court correctly applied the Supreme Court's
due process standards to maritime property owners. The present
admiralty arrest procedures do not meet these standards and
consequently do not protect the maritime owner from unwar-
ranted deprivations of his property. In order to protect both the
maritime property holder and maritime plaintiff, the Supple-
mental Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
amended to require preseizure judicial participation in the prop-
erty's arrest, and to guarantee an immediate postseizure hearing
to owners of seized maritime property.
Lance B. Nelson
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